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Introduction
Since 9/11 the range of partners in the intelligence world that share information at the
international level has grown exponentially. There seems to be little or no oversight at this
level of sharing and this paper proposes several options for attaining some kind of oversight
agreement between the intelligence agencies that collaborate in this way. This may also foster
the development of international intelligence standards, the breakdown of asymmetric
intelligence relationships and ultimately the creation of an international regime of intelligence
sharing and a global forum for collaboration between trusted partners.

What is “multilateral intelligence collaboration”?
“Given the inherently secretive character of secret intelligence, there is
immediately a tension between the need to maintain the secret, on the one
hand, and sharing the secret – or operating in a more open and collaborative
manner – on the other.”1
Warren Tucker, Head of the New Zealand Security
Intelligence Service.
The definition of multilateral intelligence collaboration used for this paper has been
developed from the following definitions: A multilateral agreement is an accord among three
or more parties, agencies, or national governments.2 Intelligence as defined by Walshand
adopted for this paper “is the collection, protection, and analysis of both publicly available
and secret information, with the goal of reducing decision makers’ uncertainty about a
foreign policy problem”.3 The oxford dictionary defines collaboration as being ‘the action of
working with someone to produce something’. So multilateral intelligence collaboration for
the purpose of this paper is an accord among three or more agencies or national governments
working together to collect, protect and analyse information to reduce decision makers
uncertainty about a foreign policy.
There is no denying the rate of change with regards to multilateral intelligence collaboration
in the last ten years. The change has been both quantitative and qualitative, and improved
intelligence co-operation has changed the way in which agencies work.4 Intelligence
collaboration occurs when both sides can see potential benefits, be it from gaining
information that helps complete the jigsaw, reducing the need for expensive surveillance in
other countries, or more recently, less developed nations gaining precious aid resources.5
1

Born, Hans, International intelligence cooperation and accountability (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), 23.
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It is common knowledge that intelligence suffers from a paradox - it is only valuable when
shared with those who need it, but the more it is shared the more it risks being compromised,
and the lower its value.6 James Clapper, current Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the
USA describes getting this right as the ‘sweet spot’ between sharing and protecting
information.7 The question is how do we decide who we trust enough to share with?
From the beginning of human history, the idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”
has encouraged intelligence sharing between nations.8 In a globalised world the shared
enemies of democratic nations have shifted from the boundaries of other nations (as
epitomised by the Cold War) to more amorphous threats such as terrorism, human trafficking,
and drug smuggling. Dealing with these international issues realistically requires an
international approach – enter multilateral intelligence collaboration. A good example of this
in action is the UKUSA agreement, a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the UK born
out of WWII that has evolved into a multilateral agreement including Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and other third party nations, over time.9
Multilateral intelligence collaboration can bring a new light to these global problems by
“bringing diverse perspectives together.”10 This gives the nations involved in this type of
collaboration the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ to deal with complex issues.11 Another benefit of
multilateral intelligence collaboration is the: “possibility of developing more common
vocabularies for thinking about problems with fewer inter-cultural and international
misunderstandings.”12
No one country can effectively cover all the areas of interest that their intelligence collection
requirements demand. By dividing up areas of responsibility amongst partner nations more
ground can be covered in more depth than by working in isolation. It is also a fact of the
current economic climate that no one nation can afford to pay the bill for comprehensive
global intelligence collection.
Why is international oversight needed?

Oversight at the international level is needed because the globalization of intelligence directly
creates an accountability deficit.13 The need for international oversight of multilateral
intelligence collaboration and the issues at hand have been cited many times in a range of
intelligence publications.14
6
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Wills et al in understanding intelligence oversight note the following four problems facing
international intelligence cooperation.15 Firstly, this collaboration potentially poses
significant risks to human rights. Intelligence services could use personal data in a way that
violates human rights. They acknowledge that although as rule intelligence services tell a
foreign partner how information they share can be used, in reality they have little control over
its use.
Secondly, how do we know how the information was obtained? Has torture or other unlawful
methods been used? If agencies are aware that collection probably violated human rights,
does that make them complicit?
Thirdly, what if intelligence services are using collaboration with foreign partners as an
excuse to avoid oversight of their own less than legitimate collection methods?
Finally, agency cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies has the risk of interfering with
their state’s foreign policy.
As we will see, despite the challenges (and there are many) of developing oversight at this
level, for intelligence to be a legitimate part of democracy it needs to be accountable.
Facing the challenges of international multilateral intelligence collaboration
There are of course in reality, many constraints on formal co-operation in the current
situation.16 The nature and extent of intelligence co-operation may be influenced by several
factors:17
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Differences in perceptions of a threat and the foreign policy objectives of the
respective states.
Asymmetrical power relations between states.
Poor human rights records of a potential partner.
Differences in legal parameters and standards.
Third Party Rule or fear of disclosure of information.
Abuse or misuse of intelligence that has been shared.
Worries about defection.

These factors help to highlight the need for strong governance and oversight in intelligence
collaboration. The issues listed above need addressing, for example, how do agencies in
journeys in shadows (London: Routledge, 2004), 20; Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus
Accountability, 27; Aldrich notes that this is an area that has long been identified ‘as an area opaque to
oversight’; Gill, Peter, Policing politics: security intelligence and the liberal democratic state (London: F. Cass,
1994): 217; Sepper, Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing, 171; “Apathetic oversight bodies
combined with few statutory restraints make intelligence networks and their activities outside the domestic
sphere the area of weakest oversight and thus accountability. As we will see, the failure to take transnational
relationships into account can render statutes limiting intelligence activity in the domestic sphere practically
toothless as well.”
15
Wills, Aidan, & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed, Forces, Guidebook: understanding
intelligence oversight (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007),
25-26.
16
Tuzuner, Musa, Intelligence cooperation practices in the 21st century: towards a culture of sharing.
(Washington, D.C.: IOS Press, 2010), 150; It is important here to acknowledge the informal information sharing
that goes on at the global level, which no doubt has a big influence on intelligence product.
17
Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” 534-536.
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multilateral sharing arrangement deal with third party rule, (originator control – ORCON)
which prevents the sharing of information with third parties without the prior permission of
the original owner of the information in a multilateral intelligence sharing arrangement.18
This is where effective oversight may help address some of these issues and increase the
legitimacy of multilateral intelligence agreements.
Despite the lack of discussion about the growing rate of international intelligence sharing
arrangements, formal and informal, the importance of this work needs to be recognised and
regulated to a degree, especially around oversight.19 Firstly, how do we deal with some of the
above issues?
Whether at the national or international level, the quality of the intelligence depends on the
quality of the source. Collaboration can help by confirming or corroborating information.
Again, this is where data integration technology could prove to be a game changer.20
Unfortunately, there is always the fear of defection by a state involved in information sharing.
James Igoe Walsh, in his book The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, seeks to
provide a solution to the problem of defection by states in information sharing arrangements.
He suggests that states seeking bilateral information sharing (as opposed to multilateral
collaborative intelligence) should be in control of the other (subordinate) states intelligence
gathering activities.21 He refers to this system as ‘hierarchy’, whereby the stronger state by
means of ‘relational contracting’ has control of the weaker states intelligence operations.22
This is at face value a rational approach for powerful states to the problem of defection in
intelligence sharing, but one that also adds to the asymmetry of current intelligence sharing
efforts. While Walsh is correct in stating that oversight is necessary when intelligence sharing
occurs to ensure authenticity, it seems that his focus is on one way information sharing (raw
data) from the weaker to the stronger nation, rather than collaboration (intelligence collection,
collaborative analysis and product development).23
Governance and oversight of International Intelligence Collaboration

International intelligence collaboration has always been fraught with problems for authorities
responsible for oversight, the scale of growth in this area since 9/11 has been such that
Aldrich contends:
“The scope and scale of co-operation has resulted in a qualitative change that
now renders traditional forms of accountability - rooted in the sovereign
nation-state - increasingly outmoded and incomplete.”24
Intelligence has undergone a revolution of sorts and is no longer the passive world of “Cold
War bean-counting.”25 Today’s intelligence product needs to provide enforcement agencies
and policy makers with the knowledge of what immediate threats they need to respond to and
18

Born, International intelligence cooperation and accountability,15, 5, 283.
Lefebvre, The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation, 528.
20
An example of this type of technology being adopted by the “Five Eyes” multilateral intelligence sharing
arrangement is Palantir technology; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palantir_Technologies for more
detail.
21
Walsh, The international politics of intelligence sharing.
22
Ibid, 5.
23
Ibid, 6.
24
Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability, 30.
25
Ibid, 55.
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disrupt, as well as those that require long term solutions.26 At the same time, intelligence
services are themselves under growing scrutiny from global civil society. In the absence of
any established international institutions, Aldrich suggests that intelligence services would be
wise to engage with these first glimmerings of global governance, rather than hide from
them.27
As Born et al note oversight is “good for [the] intelligence community as it can contribute to
thoughtful crafting of intelligence operations, and more importantly, provide them with
legitimacy.”28
Perhaps a more multilateral approach to oversight of information sharing than Walsh’s
hierarchy would result in a less asymmetrical relationship? Such an approach could start with
a group of like-minded states, already sharing intelligence, widening their circle to work with
other states in their specialist areas. As Walsh quite rightly points out, co-operating states that
agree to specialise can together create a much stronger and more comprehensive intelligence
picture/product than a state could ever achieve in isolation29. Imagine many states cooperating and using the same software to share information on a secure platform. This would
allow all members to analyse the data and share conclusions. This may initially only be used
for less politically sensitive information sharing and collaboration, at the lower classified end
of the scale, as trust and agreement on collection and sharing protocols are developed, and
defection is less of a risk.
While defection by states in information sharing arrangements is a real concern, taking over
the control of the process by the strongest state is not helpful in the long term for the
development of mutual trust, and certainly not in the best interests of the weaker participating
state. A more multilateral approach would require developing an agreed set of standards for
education, intelligence collection and analysis and protocols for sharing and collaboration,
and of course, a strong and effective oversight body.
What makes an intelligence oversight body strong and effective? Born et al30 have come up
with the five following key components:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Independence
Investigative powers
Full access
Able to maintain secrets
Support staff

As Reveron notes, a world free of suspicion may be an unreasonable demand, but “mutual
trust, compatible systems, and common laws and policies are required” in order to effectively
face global threats.31

26

Ibid.
Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability, 55.
28
Born, H., Johnson, Loch K., Leigh, I., Winkler, Theodor, & Mevik, Leif. Who's watching the spies? :
establishing intelligence service accountability (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005): 239.
29
Walsh, The international politics of intelligence sharing, 7.
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Born, Johnson, Leigh, Winkler and Mevik, Who's watching the spies, 235-236.
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Reveron, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation, 13.
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To overcome the challenge of secure collaboration across a diverse group of allies, the United
States developed a new information-sharing architecture called Combined Enterprise
Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS).32 Similarly, Palantir have a suite of digital
solutions for secure information sharing that are already being utilised by the ‘Five Eyes’
(Australian, Canadian, British, United States and New Zealand) nations for collaboration.33
Effectively these types of systems enable digital multilateral collaboration by a range of
partners.
These co-operating intelligence groups could also provide training and professional
development for their members, along with opportunities to work in each other’s agencies.
This type of professional reciprocity would have a homogenizing effect.34 With more and
more reciprocal relationships (e.g. intelligence collaboration and sharing) actors involved
start thinking and acting more and more alike, leading to an emerging regime.35
Taken further, this could lead to the standardisation of intelligence gathering, record keeping,
civil rights protection and intelligence sharing along the line of the Industry ISO9000.36 This
would begin to address many of the barriers to information sharing mentioned earlier –
simply put, if a state or agency will not answer to the standards, or at least prove that they are
working towards attaining them, they cannot be part of the sharing arrangement. That would
indeed be a game changer, and would most definitely require oversight by trusted parties.
Aldrich suggests that collaborating states could provide: “Inspectors General with extended
37
authority to operate in more than one country.” As he points out, if states can agree on the
complex information sharing agreements, then surely they can agree on criteria for
investigating officers. He envisaged someone like a former head of national service, acting as
a roving Inspector General. This person would be responsible for oversight of states involved
in multilateral intelligence sharing arrangements.38 Instead of a large and powerful state like
the US providing oversight on a ‘trust us’ basis, (Walsh’s relational contracting concept) it
could use ‘relational sub-contracting’. This could perhaps initially see trusted partners in a
multilateral arrangement (e.g. ‘Five Eyes’) providing oversight services for newer
intelligence sharing relationships, which could encourage trust, and be a less asymmetrical
and hegemonic arrangement than Walsh’s solution.
Walsh suggests, at least in reference to European Union intelligence collaboration, that:39
“Developing oversight mechanisms that more effectively allow member states to
monitor each other’s collection and sharing activities and to punish violations would
make the Union’s sharing arrangements more effective.”
One assumes that this approach would be just as beneficial for intelligence
relationships between the United States and its allies as well?
Does oversight help or hinder intelligence agencies?

32

Ibid, 10.
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34
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35
Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory,” 721.
36
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37
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For those that are fearful of the effect of greater oversight of intelligence agencies, it is noted
here that greater oversight of the Australian intelligence agencies:40
“Appears to have increased staff morale, client satisfaction, and general
efficiency. In addition, greater oversight has probably improved the image of
the agencies with the public and improved their effectiveness and relevance,
and thereby their image, within government itself.”
In order to create a future savvy international intelligence regime, the international
intelligence community and their respective states need to embrace the type of multilateral
intelligence collaboration described in this paper. For intelligence to be seen as a public good,
oversight responsibility must be shared amongst all nations involved in multilateral
agreements to avoid asymmetry in relationships. By encouraging standardised, high-level
intelligence practice and collaboration, along with databases that can enable collaboration, a
regime will be built that will benefit the intelligence community specifically, and society in
general by helping to ensure best practice and reliable, quality intelligence product. The
opportunities explored in this paper warrant further research, development and critical
discussion by the Intelligence Community globally. As the primary audience for this paper is
the people responsible for intelligence education, it would be great to see this conversation
continue at the grassroots in the classroom.
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